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THEY NEVER KEPT BUT ONE PROMISE-County of Yakima v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S.
Ct. 683 (1992).
Deborah Jo Borrero
Abstract: Despite congressional efforts to promote tribal self-determination and self-
governance, the Supreme Court continues to give effect to disastrous assimilative policies
of the past. A particularly far-reaching case, County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes
and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, upheld state property taxation of tribal land
within an Indian reservation. The decision neglects tribal sovereignty and contradicts fed-
eral policy. After Yakima Indian Nation, tribalism is in serious jeopardy once again. This
Note examines Yakima Indian Nation and concludes that Congress must intervene to
protect tribes from state property taxes to preserve tribal land and sovereignty.
"They made us many promises, more than I can remember, but they
never kept but one; they promised to take our land and they took it "'
"An Indian's land is his faith, his religion, the repository of the bones of
his fathers, part of his own being--everything, save the lives of his people,
that he holds most sacred."2
Early federal Indian policies promoted the extinguishment of tribal-
ism to obtain land for westward-bound settlers.' In the 1830s, at the
urging of President Andrew Jackson, Congress passed the Indian
Removal Act.4 Removal, according to Jackson, was necessary to
avoid Indian extermination.' The Removal Act authorized the tribes'
voluntary relocation from their homelands. From 1830 to 1835,
removal treaties with the Five Civilized Tribes of the southeastern
states were signed.6 Voluntary removal moved too slowly for the
expansionists, however, and President Jackson used the Army to com-
1. DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE 449 (1991) (quoting Chief Red
Cloud).
2. Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation.:
"As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth'"--How Long a Time Is That? 63 CAL.
L. REV. 601, 609 n.37 (1975) (citing JOSEPHY, THE NEz PERCE INDIANS AND THE OPENING OF
THE NORTHWEST 333 (abr. ed. 1971)).
3. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 79 (1982).
4. Indian Removal Act, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830).
5. President Jackson also believed the federal government should not protect tribes that
refused to emigrate from the eastern states. See H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 37, 53d Cong., 2d Sess.,
436, 438 (1893-94).
6. The southeastern tribes of the Choctaws, Creeks, Seminoles, Cherokees, and Chickasaws
represented the Five Civilized Tribes. By 1840, the majority of the tribesmen of these tribes had
been removed from their homelands east of Mississippi River. FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, THE
GREAT FATHER 78-87 (1986); see also COHEN, supra note 3, at 79.
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plete the process.7 Forced removal devastated the tribes, killing
thousands.'
Although the forced removal policies epitomized federal brutality,
the government employed other equally effective, if less violent, means
to acquire still more Indian land. As settlers moved west in search of
farm land and mineral riches, they found Indians in the way once
again. Since the tribes could be moved no further westward, they were
forced onto reservations. 9
Eventually, settlers wanted the reservation land as well. In 1887,
Congress enacted the Indian General Allotment Act (GAA).10 The
GAA provided for the allotment of tribal reservation lands to individ-
ual Indians. The alienability of individual allotments allowed for mil-
lions of acres of Indian land to pass to non-Indians."1 The land loss
contributed greatly to the destruction of tribal culture and identity. 2
Congress signalled abandonment of its quest for Indian land in the
1930s with the enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act.13 Recog-
nizing the failures of forced assimilation, congressional policy since
the 1930s has generally focused on promoting tribal sovereignty and
self-determination. 4
Recently, however, the Supreme Court judicially rejuvenated the
repudiated political policies of removal and assimilation. In County of
Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 15 the Supreme Court held that a 1906 statute authorized state
property taxation of land on the Yakima Reservation which was
owned in fee by the Tribe and its members. This Note argues that the
Yakima Indian Nation Court misconstrued the 1906 Burke Act, and
that the Court's holding violates long-established principles of federal
7. An understanding of the choices facing the eastern tribes can be gleaned from a
proclamation issued in 1838 by General Winfield Scott to the Cherokees: "My troops already
occupy many positions .... Will you... compel us to resort to arms?... I am an old warrior,
and have been present at many a scene of slaughter; but spare me, I beseech you, the horror of
witnessing the destruction of the Cherokees." See COHEN, supra note 3, at 91-92.
8. The forced migration of the Cherokee people, now known as the "Trail of Tears," took the
lives of more than 4,000 Cherokees. Id. at 92.
9. Indian reservations are lands under federal protection set aside for the residence and
exclusive use and benefit of tribal Indians. See Id. at 34, 406. Indian reservations are expressly
included in the definition of Indian country. See infra note 16.
10. General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 354, 381 (1988)).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 57-58.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 57-58.
13. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-474, 476-79 (1988); see also infra text accompanying notes 31-34.
14. See infra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
15. 112 S. Ct. 683 (1992).
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Indian law and frustrates present congressional Indian policy. Most
ominously, the Yakima Indian Nation Court's deprecatory attitude
toward Indian law further denigrates tribal sovereignty and authorizes
a legal attack upon the tribal land base.
In Part I, this Note develops the jurisdictional principles necessary
to resolve problems of state taxation in Indian country. Part II
describes the setting leading to the Yakima Indian Nation dispute and
sets forth the Court's reasoning. Part III argues that, contrary to the
Court's conclusion, Congress has not expressly authorized state taxa-
tion of reservation lands belonging to tribes or tribal members. The
Note concludes that the Yakima Indian Nation decision is contrary to
congressional Indian policy and jeopardizes the tribal land base. This
Note proposes a federal statute that would immunize tribal land from
state property taxes.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF STATE TAXING JURISDICTION IN
INDIAN COUNTRY
State attempts to tax within Indian country16 have given rise to a
tremendous amount of litigation. 7 Resolution of these disputes
requires analysis of principles of federal, state, and tribal sovereignty.
Federal legislation affects virtually all spheres of Indian life and gener-
ally preempts state law in Indian country. 8 Congressional policies
promoting tribal sovereignty also usually preempt state tax law within
Indian country. 9 Nonetheless, Congress has the power to authorize
state taxation in Indian country.20 Ascertaining congressional intent
with regard to state taxation requires consideration of vacillating fed-
eral Indian policy.
A. Congressional Plenary Power over Indian Affairs
Congressional authority over Indian affairs is often described as ple-
nary.21 Although congressional power is not absolute, it encompasses
16. Indian country includes "all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
including rights-of-way running through the reservation." 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988).
17. Eg., Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759 (1985); Bryan v. Itasca County,
426 U.S. 373 (1976); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
18. For instance, states are generally preempted from imposing net income taxes, personal
property taxes, or real property taxes on restricted land within Indian country. See COHEN,
supra note 3, at 406.
19. See infira text accompanying notes 77-79.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 80-87.
21. "The Constitution vests the Federal Government with exclusive authority over relations
with Indian tribes." Montana, 471 U.S. at 764. Congress' power over Indian affairs is based on
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virtually all Indian affairs.22 Congress' unique trust obligation toward
the tribes somewhat tempers its plenary power.
The trust relationship was first enunciated in Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia.2 3 In Cherokee Nation, Chief Justice Marshall held that trea-
ties between the United States and the tribes in which the United
States pledged to respect the tribes as distinct political communities24
gave rise to a trust relationship. The trust obligates Congress to pro-
tect tribalism and tribal government from state incursions.25
The trust duties directly impact the canons of construction of legis-
lation relating to Indians. 26 Courts construe any statute that arguably
abrogates tribal sovereignty in light of Congress' duty to protect all
Indian rights and interests.27 Statutory ambiguity is resolved in the
Indians' favor.28
B. Congressional Policies on Indian Affairs
Policy analysis is a critical component of Indian law and must be
considered in order to resolve jurisdictional disputes.29 Indian policies
have vacillated dramatically over time. In the assimilation era of the
1880s to the late 1930s, congressional policies promoted destruction of
the tribal unit.a0 Assimilation, however, is directly contradictory to
the current policy of tribal self-determination and self-goverance.31
an amalgam of sources, including the Indian commerce clause, the treaty clause, and the
supremacy clause. See COHEN, supra note 3, at 211. Congress can abrogate tribal treaty rights,
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1902), or extinguish title to tribal aboriginal lands
without compensation. Tee-Hit Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955). Congress'
power is limited by constitutional protections applicable to all citizens. For example, Congress
must pay just compensation for taking Indian land to which title is held by treaty, federal statute
or agreement. See id
22. Plenary power is broad but not absolute authority. See COHEN, supra note 3, at 217.
However, no legislation on Indian affairs has been struck down for exceeding the bounds of
congressional power. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW
82 (1987). Accordingly, it appears that, in application, plenary power is indeed absolute. See
Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal
Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. Rlv. 1137, 1139 (1990).
23. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
24. Id
25. See generally COHEN, supra note 3, at 220-21 (discussing the nature of the federal trust
responsibility).
26. See id at 221.
27. Id at 220-25.
28. Id at 224.
29. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 40-59 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
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L The Current Congressional Policy of Tribal Self-Determination
and Self-Governance
Since 1934, federal policy has promoted tribal self-determination.
32
The concept of self-determination recognizes that tribes should resolve
tribal problems.3 3 Many federal statutes promote tribal self-determi-
nation. The most important of these statutes is the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act of 1934 (IRA) which initiated the current policy of tribal
self-determination.34  The IRA promotes tribal self-sufficiency by
prohibiting further allotment of Indian lands, restricting land transfers
and extending existing trust periods.35
Congress recognized that the reduction in the tribal land base
caused by the GAA also severely impacted tribal economies.36 Thus,
Congress has purchased land to expand tribal land bases, including
that of the Yakima Indian Nation.37 Congress has also promoted tri-
bal self-determination by developing reservation economies. In 1974,
the Indian Financing Act authorized a revolving loan fund to promote
Indian economic development.3" The capital was available to help
develop and utilize Indian resources.39
2. The Policy of Allotments and Assimilation
The assimilation policy was based on the notion that Indians were
best served by a forced integration into European-American cultural
and economic institutions.' The GAA was the cornerstone of assimi-
32. The one exception to this policy occurred from 1943 to 1961 when Congress
experimented with disbanding the tribes as governmental entities. Termination of tribal
governments, however, was soon recognized as a failure and repudiated. For a comprehensive
discussion of the Termination Era see COHEN, supra note 3, at 152-80.
33. See i. at 147.
34. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-74, 476-79 (1988)).
35. See COHEN, supra note 3, at 147-49 (discussing generally the goals of the Indian
Reorganization Act). Trust periods are federal trust restrictions placed on tribal lands. See iL at
34-38. Federal trust restriction on tribal land is a distinct concept from the trust relationship
that obligates the United States to act in the best interest of the tribe. See supra text
accompanying notes 23-28.
36. One commentator noted that the Indian tribes are "a people desperately in need of an
adequate land base for an expanding population... [and] the cash settlements have been a poor
redress for centuries of exploitation." COHEN, supra note 3, at 197.
37. Pahto, renamed by non-Indians as Mount Adams, was returned to the Yakima Indian
Nation by Executive Order in 1972. A surveying error had caused the Yakima Indian Nation to
lose the sacred mountain for several decades. SHARON O'BRIEN, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL
GOVERNMENTS 181 (1980). For another example, in 1970, Congress restored Blue Lake and
forty-eight thousand acres of land in New Mexico to the Pueblo. COHEN, supra note 3, at 197.
38. 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (1988).
39. Id.
40. COHEN, supra note 3, at 139.
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lative policy.4 1 The GAA allotted reservation land to individual Indi-
ans.42 This advanced two congressional goals. First, allotment forced
Indians to adopt a nontraditional agrarian existence.43 Second, it also
opened up "excess lands" for non-Indian settlement.'
Several restrictions were placed on the allotments for the Indians'
protection. Congress recognized, from its experience with earlier
Indian allotments, that unscrupulous non-Indians could swindle allot-
ted land from Indians unfamiliar with American property law.45
Accordingly, Congress provided in section 5 that title to individual
allotments was to be held in trust by the United States for twenty-five
years." During the trust period allottees could not sell or encumber
their land.47
The twenty-five-year trust, however, failed to protect the individual
allotments. Again, too much land passed from Indian ownership.
Continued demand for, and poor administration of, Indian land
resulted in numerous ill-advised amendments to the GAA.48 These
amendments removed many restrictions placed on the sale of allot-
ments by the original Act.4 9
In 1906, Congress enacted the Burke Act, removing the twenty-five-
year trust period. 50 The 1906 amendment provided for the issuance of
patents prior to the expiration of the trust period and made clear that
federal trust restrictions were not lifted until after the conveyance of a
41. See id. at 128-36.
42. Originally, the GAA allotted 160 acres of land to each head of household and 40 acres to
minors. In 1891, Congress amended the Act to provide 80 acres of agricultural land or 160 acres
of grazing land to each Indian. Act of Feb. 28, 1891, ch. 383, §§ 1-2, 26 Stat. 794 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1988)); see also Readjustment of lndian Affairs: Hearings on H.R.
7902 Before House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 428-89 (1934); COHEN, supra
note 3, at 133.
43. In his Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, October 10 1882, the
commissioner predicted that ". . . one of two things must eventually take place ... either
civilization or extermination of the Indian." H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 1, 47th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3,
reprinted in FRANcIs P. PRUCHA, DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 156 (1975).
44. COHEN, supra note 3, at 128-29.
45. Id. at 130.
46. Id. at 131.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 132-34 (discussing the development of the GAA).
49. See id. For example, in 1902, Congress authorized the adult heirs of an allottee to
petition for sale of the allotment. Appropriation Act of May 27, 1902, 25 U.S.C. § 379 (1988).
50. The 1906 amendment to the GAA, commonly known as the Burke Act, provided that
... the Secretary ... may,... whenever he shall be satisfied that any Indian allottee is
competent and capable of managing his or her affairs at any time to cause to be issued to
such allottee a patent in fee simple, and thereafter all restrictions as to sale, incumbrance, or
taxation of said land shall be removed ....
25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988).
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patent in fee."1 The Secretary of the Interior was required to deter-
mine whether Indian allottees were capable of managing their own
financial affairs before issuing a patent.5 2 Compliance with the compe-
tency requirement varied.53 In 1927, recognizing the ineffectiveness of
the Burke Act, Congress authorized the Secretary to cancel patents
issued prior to the expiration of the trust period.54
The Allotment Era devastated Indian country. The Indians never
became successful farmers.5 The lands allotted to the Indians often
were unsuitable for agriculture.56 Lack of adequate training, inappro-
priate farming implements, and in some instances, cultural beliefs, all
contributed to the failure of the GAA to produce Indian farmers.5 7
The loss of the Indian land base posed the most significant threat to
the tribes. The GAA broke up reservations across the country. From
1887 to 1934, Indian land holdings were reduced from 138 million to
48 million acres.5 8 The GAA separated Indians from their land and
weakened tribal leadership and autonomy.5 9
C. Tribal Power
Since the 1930s, congressional policies promoting tribal self-govern-
ment and self-determination have resurrected tribal power. Tribal
authority, however, is not delegated by the federal government. It is
inherent in the tribes' original status as independent governing
nations.60
Initially, the judiciary recognized an area of core tribal sovereignty,
free from the dominion of the federal or state governments.6 ' Chief
51. Id. The Burke Act was passed in response to In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488 (1905), overruled by
United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916), which held that states had jurisdiction upon issuance
of a trust patent. The Burke Act clarified that federal trust restrictions would not be lifted until a
patent had been conveyed in fee. See supra note 50. Since In re Heff, Bryan v. Itasca County,
426 U.S. 373 (1976) has made clear that state civil jurisdiction does not impliedly authorize state
taxation.
52. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988). See also COHEN, supra note 3, at 136-38 (discussing generally the
history of the Burke Act).
53. See COHEN, supra note 3, at 136-37.
54. 25 U.S.C. §§ 352a, 352b.
55. COHEN, supra note 3, at 134-35.
56. See i.
57. See id.
58. Of this, about 27 million acres passed from Indian allottees by sales between 1887 and
1934. Another 60 million acres were either ceded outright or sold to non-Indian homesteaders
and corporations as "surplus" lands. Id at 138.
59. See i. at 137, 143.
60. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1978).
61. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
Washington Law Review
Justice Marshall analogized the tribes to nation-states, 6 recognizing
them as "distinct, independent, political communities. ' 63 Indian
tribes possessed exclusive authority and rights to all of the land within
their territorial boundaries with which "no state could interfere."
64
The Supreme Court has since retreated from Marshall's expansive
view of tribal sovereignty.65 The modem view of tribal sovereignty
holds that Congress may abrogate any aspect of tribal sovereignty.66
The Supreme Court has further described tribal power as that of a
"quasi-sovereign" which tribes may exercise "unless inconsistent with
their status."
67
Modem tribes function very much like more familiar sovereigns.
68
Tribes determine their own governmental structures and membership
and may exclude persons from their land.69 They also have the power
to tax in order to fund government services such as road maintenance,
schools, and social and health services.7' Indian tribes may tax Indi-
ans and, in some instances, non-Indians.71
D. State Taxing Authority in Indian Country
Indian reservations are set aside for the exclusive use and benefit of
tribes to promote tribal self-government and economic support.7
Federal interests in promoting tribal self-determination will often pre-
empt state taxation of Indians within Indian country.73 Courts have
62. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832).
63. Id. at 559.
64. Id. at 560.
65. There now appears to be no area of tribal government that is not subject to the
encroachment of the federal government. "The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain ...
exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance." United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
66. The Supreme Court's view of retained tribal sovereignty has deteriorated further since
Wheeler. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). In Duro, the Supreme Court held that an
Indian tribal court had no power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. Id.
at 679. Duro, however, was subsequently overruled by Congress. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (Supp,
1992).
67. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
68. See COHEN, supra note 3, at 246-57 (discussing the general so3pe of tribal powers).
69. See id.
70. See O'BRIEN, supra note 37, at 232-34, 238-54 (1989); see also AMERICAN INDIAN
LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, INC., INDIAN TRIBES AS SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS 37 (1988).
71. The courts have upheld tribal taxing authority of non-Indians in some instances. See
Washington v. Confederated Colville Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1980); Morris v. Hitchcock,
194 U.S. 384 (1904). Congress may, however, limit tribal taxing power. See COHEN, supra note
3, at 431-37 (discussing general tribal taxing jurisdiction).
72. COHEN, supra note 3, at 406.
73. Id. Federal policy can either generally or specifically preempt state jurisdiction. Most
often states are generally preempted. General federal preemption is determined by examining the
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upheld federal preemption of state taxation in a number of cases.7
Although Congress can authorize state taxation, congressional author-
ization must be "unmistakably clear." 75 Further, the Court may
require that there be evidence that Congress specifically considered the
application of the tax with respect to Indians.7 6
Indian tribes and their members are generally immune from state
taxation within their own territory, because the federal interests in tri-
bal sovereignty and economic self-sufficiency preempt state law. 7 The
Supreme Court has adopted a "per se" rule barring state taxation of
Indian tribes and tribal members on reservations.78 States may, how-
ever, tax non-Indian activities on reservations if the tax does not
infringe upon tribal rights of self-governance.79
The Supreme Court has held that congressional authorization of
state taxation of Indians in Indian country must be "unmistakably
clear."80 The barrier imposed by the "unmistakably clear" rule is
illustrated in Bryan v. Itasca County."1 The statute construed in Bryan
vested six states with civil jurisdiction over Indian country. 2 The
relevant federal statutes, their underlying policies, retained tribal sovereignty, and the historical
traditions of tribal independence. Id at 270-75.
74. See, eg., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Moe v. Confederated Salish &
Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (preempting personal property tax); McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (preempting a state income tax); The New York
Indians, 72 U.S. (5 How.) 761 (1867) (preempting state real property tax on restricted Indian
land).
75. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 765 (1985).
76. Statutory language referencing only reservations and not specifically Indians may indicate
that the statute does not apply to Indians. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448
U.S. 136, 152 n.16 (1980). In White Mountain Apache, the Court held that although the Hayden-
Cartright Act authorized state taxes "on United States military or other reservations" the
language did not overcome the federal preemption of state taxation with respect to Indian
Reservations. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Eg., Montana, 471 U.S. at 764, 766-68; White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at
143-44; Bryan, 426 U.S. at 391-92.
78. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 215 n.17 (1987). This rule
"recognize[s] that the federal tradition of Indian immunity from state taxation is very strong and
that the state interest in taxation is correspondingly weak." Id
79. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 142-43. State taxation may also be preempted
if it "interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless
the state interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority." Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
80. Montana, 471 U.S. at 765.
81. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
82. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (§ 7 repealed and reenacted as amended 1968)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1988), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1988), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1360 (1988)). "The popular name of this Act, Public Law 280, is applied generally to the
complex statutory scheme for federal delegation to the states of jurisdiction over Indian lands
that evolved from this Act and subesquent amendments, repeals, and reinactments." COHEN,
supra note 3, at 175 n.254.
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Bryan Court held that this grant of civil jurisdiction did not authorize
state taxation of reservation Indians.8"
A similar result was reached in Moe v. Confederated Salish and Koo-
tenai Tribes. 84 The Moe Court held that section 6 of the GAA did not
expressly authorize state personal property taxation of tribal members
residing on a reservation.85 The Moe Court reasoned that language
subjecting owners of allotted land "to the laws, both civil and crimi-
nal, of the State or Territory in which they may reside" did not mani-
fest Congress' clear intent to authorize state taxation of reservation
Indians.16 The Supreme Court has also construed federal law in light
of tribal sovereignty and congressional policy supporting tribal self-
determination. 7
II. COUNTY OF YAKIMA V CONFEDERATED TRIBES AND
BANDS OF THE YAKIMA INDIAN NATION
In 1855, a treaty established the Yakima Indian Reservation.88 Pres-
ently, eighty percent of the reservation is held in trust by the United
States for the Yakima Indian Nation.89 The remaining twenty per-
cent, or 260,000 acres, is fee land owned by Indians and non-Indians.
The Yakima Indian Nation and tribal members own less than one per-
cent of this fee land.91
In 1987, Yakima County began foreclosure proceedings to collect
unpaid state ad valorem9z and excise taxes on certain fee-patent reser-
83. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 392.
84. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
85. Id.
86. Id at 478-80. Section 6 of the GAA, prior to the amendment by the 1906 Burke Act,
provided that:
At the expiration of the trust period and when the lands have been conveyed to the Indians
by patent in fee... then each and every allottee shall have the benefit of and be subject to
the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory in which they may reside.
Indian General Allotment Act ch. 119, § 6, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 349
(1988)).
87. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1980).
88. Treaty with the Yakima, 1855, 12 Stat. 951, reprinted in INDIAN TREATIES 1778-1883, at
698 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 3d ed. 1975).
89. Brief for Respondent/Cross Petitioner, Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation at 7, County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683 (1992) (Nos. 90-408, 90-577).
90. Id.
91. Id. The remaining 99% is owned either by non-Indians or ncninembers. See id. at 7-8.
92. An ad valorem tax is "a tax imposed on the value of property." BLACK'S LAW
DiCTiONARY 51 (6th ed. 1990). In Washington, state liability for the ad valorem tax flows
exclusively from ownership of realty on the annual date of assessment and creates a burden on
the property alone. WASH. REv. CODE § 84.60.020 (1989).
946
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vation lands.93 Some of the delinquent parcels were owned by the
Yakima Indian Nation.94 Other parcels were owned by individual tri-
bal members.9" The Tribe filed suit for declaratory and injunctive
relief, claiming that federal law prohibited the imposition or collection
of the taxes on all fee-patent reservation lands.9 6
The Supreme Court in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes
and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation held that the state could
impose an ad valorem tax on reservation fee land owned by the
Yakima Indian Nation and its tribal members.97 The Court acknowl-
edged that the tax would be upheld only on an "unmistakably clear"
expression of congressional intent.98 The Court found such an expres-
sion by focusing on language in the 1906 Burke Act removing "all
restrictions as to sale, incumbrance, or taxation of said land." 99 The
Court determined that this language evidenced Congress' "clear inten-
tion" to authorize state taxation of fee-patent reservation land."° The
Court rejected the Tribe's argument that Congress had impliedly
repealed the Burke Act of 1906 by later repudiating the GAA.101 It
further rejected the United States' argument that the GAA "removed
only those barriers to state jurisdiction that existed at the time of its
enactment," such as trust status of allotted land and barriers associ-
ated with tribal sovereignty.1 °2 The Court also concluded that policy
93. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 112
S. Ct. 683, 687 (1992). Yakima County's suggestion that tribal members had been paying the ad
valorem and excise taxes without incident for decades was contested by the Yakima Indian
Nation which contended that tribal members had but recently begun acquiring fee property as a
place to live. Brief for Respondent/Cross Petitioner, Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation at 9 n.5, County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683 (1992) (Nos. 90-408, 90-577).
94. Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. at 687.
95. Id
96. Id The Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals' analysis which held that the ad
valorem tax was impermissible if it threatened or had "some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe." Id. at 692. The Supreme
Court agreed with the court of appeals, however, that the Burke Act did not authorize excise
taxes. Id. at 693-94.
97. Id. at 694. The Yakima Indian Nation Court held that § 6 of the GAA as amended, also
known as the Burke Act, did not authorize an excise tax on the sale of fee lands because the Act
says only "taxation of... land" and an interpretation of the ambiguous provision in favor of the
Indians precludes a state sales tax on tribal land. Id
98. Id at 688.
99. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988); see supra note 50.
100. Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. CL at 688.
101. Id. at 689-90.
102. Id. at 689.
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considerations, such as the abrogation of tribal sovereignty, did not
belong in its forum."0 3
III. THE COURT HAS SANCTIONED THE CONFISCATION
OF INDIAN LAND
The Yakima Indian Nation Court's interpretation of the Burke Act
is mistaken and the Court's reasoning demonstrates its complete disre-
gard for the principles for tribal sovereignty. The Supreme Court
inappropriately relied upon an ambiguous provision of the Burke Act
with expressly limited scope, to ascertain clear congressional intent to
allow state property taxation. The Yakima Indian Nation decision
has, accordingly, delivered a blow to Indian tribes still struggling to
recover from early policies of forced removal and assimilation. 104 Hav-
ing already lost the majority of their lands, tribes and tribal members
must now either pay state property taxes or face losing their fee lands
to governmental authorities.
A. The Burke Act Does Not Authorize State Property Taxation
The Burke Act proviso, relied upon by the Yakima Indian Nation
Court, is ambiguous at best. The Act, therefore, is not "unmistakably
clear" congressional consent for state taxation of Indian fee land.105
Careful examination of the Burke Act reveals two reasons why the Act
does not expressly authorize state property taxes. First, the Act by its
terms applies only to fee patents issued prematurely under the
GAA. 106 Second, the Burke Act only lifts the federal trust restrictions
to state taxing jurisdiction.1 7 Consequently, the Act is not the affirm-
ative manifestation of congressional intent required to overcome fed-
eral preemption of state tax law.
L The Court Misreads the Burke Act: Inferences and Implication
Are Not "Unmistakably Clear" Intent
The Yakima Indian Nation Court inappropriately read a statute
that applied only to a fraction of reservation fee lead as manifestation
of congressional intent to allow state property taxation on all reserva-
103. Id. at 692.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 55-59.
105. For purposes of this Note, Indian fee land refers to land held by the tribe or tribal
members.
106. The Burke Act refers only to those patents issued prior to the expiration of the 25 year
trust period placed on allotted lands in the 1887 GAA. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1988).
107. Id. § 349 (1988).
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tion fee land."'8 To arrive at this conclusion, the Court drew a
number of inferences from less than explicit statutory language. The
Yakima Indian Nation Court accurately recognized that the GAA did
not explicitly authorize state property taxation.'0 After acknowledg-
ing the GAA's lack of explicit authorization, the Court found that the
GAA impliedly authorized state taxation. ° The Court supported
this interpretation by noting that it would be "strange" for Congress
to allow the alienability of Indian land and yet insulate Indians from
state property taxes.'
As an aid to determining the "unmistakably clear" intent of Con-
gress, the Court resorted to a proviso in the Burke Act enacted
nineteen years after the GAA. Although the proviso applied only to
prematurely patented land, the Court reasoned that it confirmed the
implications of the GAA. 112
The Yakima Indian Nation Court's reasoning is flawed. Congress
passed the Burke Act to provide a mechanism for the Secretary of the
Interior to issue patents prior to the end of the twenty-five-year trust
period mandated by the GAA.113 Neither the text of the Burke Act
108. The Burke Act proviso only lifted trust restrictions as to the "sale, incumbrance, or
taxation" of land patented before the end of the 25 year trust period. The tax at issue in Yakima
Indian Nation was assessed irrespective of when the patents were issued. "Mhe record does not
show which (if any) of the parcels owned in fee by the Yakima Indian Nation or individual
members originally passed into fee status pursuant to the proviso, rather than at the expiration of
the trust period." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae supporting Respondent/Cross-
Petitioner at 13 n.10, County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683 (1992) (Nos. 90-408, 90-577).
109. "In other words, the proviso reaffirmed for such 'prematurely' patented land what § 5 of
the GAA implied with respect to patented land generally: subjection to state real estate taxes."
County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation at 691 (1992)
(emphasis added); see also id. at 695 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The language of § 5 of the GAA, which the Court found to only imply state real estate taxes
provides: ".... and that at the expiration of said period the United States will convey the same by
patent to said Indian, or his heirs as aforesaid, in fee, discharged of said trust and free of all
charge or incumbrance whatsoever." Indian General Allotment Act, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1988)).
110. Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. at 691.
111. Id. The fact that the Court finds it "strange" to alienate land without subjecting it tax is
not a substitute for "unmistakably clear" intent. Given Congress' trust responsibilities toward
the tribes, it is not readily apparent why it would be so "strange" that Congress would insulate
Indians from state property taxation. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976)
(concluding that state civil jurisdiction over Indian country does not include state taxation
power); see also Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. at 696 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
112. See supra note 109.
113. COHEN, supra note 3, at 136.
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nor the legislative history indicate that Congress intended to authorize
state property taxation on all patented land. 
1 14
Even accepting that the inference the Court draws is logical, an
inference does not constitute unmistakably clear consent for state
property taxation. 115 The majority concedes that the GAA only
implied subjection to state property tax. ' 16 Combining a limited pro-
viso with an implication does not constitute unmistakably clear con-
sent for state property tax."' The Court should have held that an act
with limited application cannot support such a showing and that an
implication is not enough to demonstrate clear consent.
2. The Burke Act Only Lifts One Barrier to State Taxation
Accepting, somehow, the Court's conclusion that the Burke Act
applied to all allotted land, not merely prematurely patented allot-
ments, the operative language still does not provide unmistakably
clear intent to authorize state taxation. The Burke Act lifted trust
restrictions as to "sale, incumbrance, or taxation" '118 in place during
the twenty-five-year trust period. By relying on the Act for congres-
sional authorization, the Yakima Indian Nation Court failed to recog-
nize that two separate barriers exist to state taxation of allotted Indian
land in Indian country. These barriers are: 1) federal trusteeship over
the allotment,1 19 and 2) federal preemption of state law.'20
The Burke Act only removed the initial barrier-the federal trustee-
ship.11  Lifting trust restrictions as to taxation does not affirmatively
114. See 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988); see also 40 CONG. REc. 3598-3602, 5605-06 (1906).
115. See Bryan, 426 U.S. at 392 (holding that state taxation will not be implied from a statute
conferring state general civil jurisdiction over Indian country). The dissent in Yakima Indian
Nation also notes that "a 'mere implication' falls far short of the 'unmistakably clear' intent
standard." Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. at 696 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
116. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
117. Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. at 696 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The Yakima Indian Nation majority itself identifies ambiguity in the GAA as
amended. The GAA, as the Court noted, does not authorize "taxation based on the value of
land." Id. at 694. Property taxes in Washington state are based on the value of land. WASH.
REv. CoDE § 84.40.030 (1989). The Court, however, does not explain this contradiction.
118. The Burke Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 182, 183 (codified as 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988)).
119. See supra note 35; see also O'BRIEN, supra note 37, at 284.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 77-87.
121. The use of the term "restriction" in the Burke Act supports this conclusion.
"Restrictions" as to "sale" and "incumbrances" lasted only during the trust period. By contrast,
25 U.S.C. § 379 (1988) demonstrates Congress' manifest intent to allow taxation of allotments of
lands patented to white allottees. This statute provides: "All allotted land so alienated by the
heirs of an Indian allottee and all land so patented to a white allottee shall thereupon be subject
to taxation under the laws of the State or Territory where the same is situated .... Id.
950
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authorize state taxation of Indians.122 State taxation of Indian land
remains preempted until Congress manifests a clear purpose to allow
tax.12 3 The Burke Act provides no more manifest consent to state tax-
ation than does the GAA itself.124 The removal of trust restrictions
merely left the prematurely patented lands with the same status as
land patented after the twenty-five-year trust period. At best the
Burke Act is ambiguous. 25 Under the cannon of statutory construc-
tion that ambiguities must be resolved in the Indians' favor, the provi-
sion cannot be an express authorization for state property taxation.1 26
The Yakima Indian Nation Court's conclusion is untenable in light
of the fact that neither the Burke Act itself nor the floor discussion of
Congress mention state property taxes over tribes or tribal mem-
bers. 127 Subjecting tribal government and reservation Indians to state
property taxation and possibly foreclosure proceedings is a dramatic
departure from current congressional policies promoting tribal self-
governance. 28 Had Congress intended such a drastic result some dis-
cussion or express language would be expected. 29
3. The Court's Disregard For Tribal Sovereignty Blinds It to the
Burke Act's Obvious Ambiguity
The Yakima Indian Nation Court's failure to recognize the seem-
ingly obvious ambiguity of the Burke Act may be due to its total disre-
gard of tribal sovereignty.1 0 Had the Yakima Indian Nation Court
accorded tribal sovereignty proper respect it would have discerned
122. See COHEN, supra note 3, at 411.
123. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 475-76 (1976).
124. The Court concedes that there is no explicit consent to state tax within the GAA. See
supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 80-87. For an example of manifest congressional
intent to impose state taxation see also supra note 121 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 379 (1988)).
126. This interpretation does not render the language meaningless. States would be free to
tax non-Indian owned allotments in Indian country. See, eg., 25 U.S.C. § 379 (1988).
127. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text; see also County of Yakima v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683, 696 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
129. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 381 (1976); see also COHEN, supra note 3, at
411 n.57.
130. The Yakima Indian Nation majority concluded that the tribe's concern that state
property taxes would further denigrate tribal sovereignty and self-determination was "a great
exaggeration." Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. at 692. The Court's disregard for tribal
sovereignty directly contradicts its earlier statement that statutes should be construed against the
backdrop of tribal sovereignty. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
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ambiguity rather than "unmistakably clear intent." '131 Instead, the
Court denigrated tribal sovereignty, 132 and dismissed concerns for tri-
bal self-determination as "a great exaggeration.' 1 33 One example of
the Court's disregard for tribal sovereignty was its failure to distin-
guish between the possible owners of allotted land.
Indian allottees could dispose of their allotments in several ways.
They could retain the lands for themselves, or could sell their allot-
ments to the tribe, another Indian, or a non-Indian. The Burke Act
does not specify whether the lifting of trust restrictions applied to all
fee patent land, regardless of ownership, or just to land then owned by
non-Indians. 134 In light of the federal interest in protecting tribal gov-
ernment from state incursions, 135 it is logical that lifting restrictions as
to "sale, incumbrance or taxation," '136 at best permitted taxation of
land after it passed to non-Indians. 137 Taking land from either indi-
vidual tribal members or tribes threatens tribal sovereignty by reduc-
ing the tribal land base. 138 Had the Court accorded sufficient respect
to tribal sovereignty, it could only have found that the Burke Act did
not signal abandonment of that responsibility.
139
B. The Yakima Indian Nation Reasoning Denigrates Tribal
Sovereignty
The Yakima Indian Nation reasoning represents a severe threat to
tribes and Indians. The Court's reasoning completely ignores the inte-
131. When addressing problems of preemption, the Court balances the competing interests
"in light of traditional notions of Indian sovereignty and the congressional goal of Indian self-
government, including its 'overriding goal' of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic
development." California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987). The
Yakima Indian Nation Court should have used the same approach to reveal latent ambiguities.
132. The Court disparagingly refers to the "platonic notions of Indian sovereignty." Yakima
Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. at 687.
133. Id. at 692.
134. See supra note 50.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 21-27; see also Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S.
553, 568 (1903) (stating that the Court must presume that Congress acted in "perfect good faith"
in light of its trust responsibilities in its dealings with the Indians).
136. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988).
137. Compare the Burke Act proviso with 25 U.S.C. § 379, which specifically authorized
taxation only over white allottees.
138. See infra notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
139. See Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976). In Moe, the
Court held that its decisions have followed the lead of Congress in interpreting legislation
affecting Indian affairs. Id at 479. The Yakima Indian Nation Court attempts to distinguish its
decision from Moe by arguing that the in personam jurisdiction at issue in Moe was significantly
more disruptive of self-determination than state property taxes. County of Yakima v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683, 692 (1992). The
Court's conclusion ethnocentrically discounts the importance of land to tribal culture.
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gral relationship between tribal lands and Indian culture,1" frustrates
federal Indian self-determination policy,"' and threatens tribal
sovereignty.
The Yakima Indian Nation Court's decision contradicts its own pre-
cedent interpreting statutes affecting Indian affairs in light of congres-
sional goals promoting tribal sovereignty and self-sufficiency.142
Tribes are now faced with a judiciary allowing repudiated policies of
assimilation to denigrate self-determination.
1. The Yakima Indian Nation Reasoning is an Anathema to Tribal
Self-determination
State property taxation compromises tribal sovereignty and self-
determination by subordinating tribes' governing authority to that of
the states. 143 This cannot be reconciled with federal policies that pro-
mote tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal
government. 144 Moreover, state property taxes restrict tribes' inherent
authority to impose their own taxes 145 because the very low income
140. See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
141. Congressional goals promoting tribal sovereignty and self-sufficiency were reaffirmed by
President George Bush in his statement that "the concepts of forced termination and excess
dependency on the Federal Government must now be relegated, once and for all, to the history
books [as] we move forward toward a permanent relationship of understanding and trust ......
Presidential Statement of Jan. 14, 1991, cited in Brief for Native American Rights Fund as
Amicus Curiae supporting Respondent/Cross Petitioner, Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation at 12, County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683 (1992) (Nos. 90-408, 90-577).
142. See Moe, 425 U.S. at 479; see also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S.
136, 143-44 (1980) ("Ambiguities in federal law have been construed generously in order to
comport with... traditional notions of sovereignty and with the federal policy of encouraging
tribal independence.").
143. Subjecting reservation Indians to state government taxation abrogates tribal sovereignty
by reducing tribal governments to little more than "... private, voluntary organizations ...."
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975). For, as the Supreme Court has noted, "Itihe
power to tax [is] the power to destroy." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431
(1819). The Court has also recognized that "general regulatory control might relegate tribal
governments to a level below that of counties and municipalities, thus essentially destroying
them, particularly if they might raise revenue after the tax base had been filtered through many
governmental layers of taxation." Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 388 n.14 (1976).
144. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 179 (1973) ("[We are far from
convinced that when a state imposes taxes upon reservation members without their consent, its
action can be reconciled with tribal self-determination."). The Yakima Indian Nation Court
however states only that "these policy objections do not belong in this forum." County of
Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683, 692
(1992).
145. "The power to levy taxes and similar exactions is an inherent and essential part of the
authority of any government. The power is therefore an aspect of the retained sovereignty of
Indian tribes except where it has been limited or withdrawn by federal authority." See COHEN,
supra note 3, at 431.
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levels prevalent on most reservations would not support multiple
levels of taxation without imposing significant hardship.1" Tribes will
be forced to choose between imposing impossible burdens on its mem-
bers or abandoning essential tribal services.
The Yakima Tribe provides services such as road maintenance,
alcohol rehabilitation and fire protection to residents on the reserva-
tion. 147 The federal policies of self-government and self-determination
support continued tribal administration of these services.14 8 A state
tax would limit the feasibility of the Tribe imposing its own tax upon
the reservation for the many services it renders. If tribes cannot feasi-
bly tax reservation land, they must rely more heavily on federal assist-
ance to maintain programs, thereby diminishing Tribal self-reliance.149
Tribes may also be forced to subsidize the payment of state property
taxes. For example, some Yakima Indians purchased allotment lands
with loans from the Tribe.1 50 To protect its mortgage, the Tribe may
be forced to forgive portions of individuals' loans or pay the state taxes
directly to ensure that the state taxes are paid.1 5 1 This system further
overburdens the tribal governments that already fand services on the
reservation. Given the relative wealth of the sovereigns, tribal subsidi-
zation of the state is patently unreasonable.
2. The Yakima Indian Nation Decision Revives the Assimilative
Policies and Threatens the Tribal Land Base
Yakima Indian Nation also threatens tribal sovereignty by sanction-
ing an attack on the tribal land base. The Yakima Indian Nation
146. Indians as a group are the most impoverished. "On virtually every scale of
measurement-employment, income, education, health-the condition of Indian people ranks at
the bottom." Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations
for Indian Policy, H.R. Doc. No. 363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970). The overall Indian average
income per year is the lowest among any ethnic group. DAVID GETCHES & CHARLES
WILKINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 8 (2d ed. 1986).
147. The Yakima Indian Nation spends more than $5,000,000.00 of its annual tribal income
funding tribal government programs. The Yakima Indian Nation also funds law enforcement on
the reservation in almost equal proportion to the county. Members of the Yakima Indian Nation
also each contribute approximately $700.00 per year to help fund th: tribal government. Brief
for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner, Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation
at 8, County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S.
Ct. 683 (1992); see also Yakima Indian Agency Telephone Directory listing the services in
operation on the Yakima Indian Reservation (on file with the Washington Law Review).
148. See supra notes 32-39, 68-71 and accompanying text; see also O'BRIEN, supra note 37, at
238 (1980).
149. See supra notes 32-39, 68-71 and accompanying text.
150. Jack Fiander, Phone Conversation with Yakima Indian Nation tribal attorney (Feb. 3,
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Court failed to recognize the practical implications of state property
taxation of Indian land. The decision clears the path for state foreclo-
sure upon Indian fee land within Indian reservations. If states can tax
Indian property, the next step is foreclosure on delinquent parcels.
Tax sales of Indian land will shrink the tribal land base and threaten
tribal sovereignty."5 2 This result is irreconcilable with federal trust
responsibilities of protecting tribal sovereignty from state encroach-
ment.1 53 State foreclosure of tribal land is also counter to the explicit
federal policy of increasing the tribal land base.154
Tribal land is inextricably connected to tribal culture.155 The
Yakima Indian Nation decision ignores the cultural importance of
land to the Indian people and defers to ambiguous congressional intent
of rejected policies of assimilation.156 Tribes often have insisted on the
return of confiscated land, rather than monetary compensation.157
The Yakima Indian Nation decision elevates Anglo-American notions
of land ownership and alienability over tribal tradition and culture.158
152. "As the Indian estate has dwindled, Indian poverty and pauperism have increased
alarmingly. It is estimated that there are now more that 100,000 landless Indians, a number
which will inevitably and rapidly increase as long as the present system operates to deprive them
of land and home." S. RES. 3645, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. RPc. 11728 (1934) (statement
of Rep. Howard). This poverty contributed to high Indian death rates. For example, Indians
became seven times more likely than the general population to die from tuberculosis. Id.
153. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. The federal goal of increasing the tribal
land base has also been furthered by the efforts of the tribes themselves. For example, the
Yakima Indian Nation has struggled to overcome the effects of allotment by consolidating and
enlarging their tribal land base. Since 1954, the Tribe, through its Land Enterprise Office, has
purchased all available Indian and non-Indian land within their reservation's boundaries. See
O'BRIEN, supra note 37, at 192-95 (discussing the effects of allotment on tribal resource
management and agricultural potential and the Yakima Indian Nation's response).
155. The words of a famous chief are illustrative: "[U]nderstand me fully with reference to
my affection for the land ... I claim a right to live on my land, and accord you the privilege to
live on yours." BROWN, supra note 1, at 316 (quoting Hinmot Tooyalaket (Chief Joseph) of the
Nez Perces).
156. "Indian beliefs teach that all aspects of life are sacred. The sky is the Father and the
earth is the Mother, the creators of all life. Together they form a whole, the sacred circle." See
O'BRIEN, supra note 37, at 212.
157. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). Although the tribe was
awarded a substantial judgment, the tribe refused to accept the money, requesting instead that
Congress authorize the return of their land. See also Frickey, supra note 22, at 1223.
158. Indian culture and tribalism is uniquely tied to its land. Allotment "encourag[ed] the
destruction of everything that was uniquely Indian, whether art or language or social custom,
mythology or religion, or tribal and clan organization.... [and] ... destroyed a heritage that
would make a colorful and priceless contribution to our own civilization...." S. REs. 3645, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. REc. 11729 (1934) (Statement of Rep. Howard).
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IV. A CONGRESSIONAL SOLUTION: TRIBAL AND
TRIBAL MEMBER IMMUNITY FROM STATE
PROPERTY TAXATION
Congress should overrule the Yakima Indian Nation decision in
order to protect its policies of self-determination and tribal sover-
eignty. 159 A state property tax bar that would protect the Indian land
base and tribal sovereignty from state incursion is the only way Con-
gress can fulfill its unique trust obligations.
Accordingly, Congress should enact a statute expressly immunizing
fee land in Indian country from state property taxation. Without leg-
islative intervention, after Yakima Indian Nation, Indian tribes are
subject to the long-discredited assimilative policies of the GAA. Once
again, tribes will lose their land base and potentially their cultural
identity.1" Yakima Indian Nation potentially subjects thousands of
acres of Indian fee lands to foreclosure proceedings. 161 Given the his-
toric hostility between states and tribes, tribes must resort to Congress
for relief.
Express prohibition of state property taxes would prevent further
reduction of the Indian land base through state foreclosure proceed-
ings. The statute would also provide clear congressional guidance for
the judiciary and tribal planners. Courts would no longer have the
liberty to resuscitate ancient statutes enacted in a very different polit-
ical and moral climate as indicative of congressional intent.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Yakima Indian Nation has revived the repu-
diated policy of assimilation and approved further erosion of the tribal
land base. Tribes and their members struggling to regain economic
self-sufficiency are now faced with the additional burden of state prop-
erty taxation. State property taxes empower the state to foreclose
upon delinquent parcels of land and contradict federal policies pro-
moting tribal sovereignty and self-determination.
To prevent further attacks on the tribal land base and denigration of
tribal sovereignty, Congress must enact a statute providing tribal
immunity from state property taxation. An immunity statute would
distance, rather than recall, the devastation wrought on Indian culture
159. Congress has before recognized its responsibility to overturn Supreme Court decisions
that are anathemas to inherent tribal sovereignty. See supra note 66.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 55-59.
161. See U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, FEDERAL AND STATE INDIAN RESERVATION AND
INDIAN TRUST LANDS (1974).
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and tribalism through federal policies of assimilation. Without
express tribal immunity, congressional policy promoting tribal sover-
eignty remains only a promise and not a reality for the tribes.
